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NOT GUILTY AND INNOCENT-THE PROBLEM
CHILDREN OF REASONABLE DOUBT
Vincent T. Bugliosi*
I. INTRODUCTION
The terms not guilty and innocent have an interesting, almost
symbiotic, relationship to each other in American criminal juris-
prudence. A defendant is legally presumed to be innocent, but he
pleads not guilty to the charges brought by the prosecution. A
defendant usually presents evidence to show, and he argues, that
he is innocent. And courts regularly instruct the jury that they are
to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In the end,
however, he is found to be guilty or not guilty. If the verdict is not
guilty, newspapers normally say he was found to be innocent.
The legal distinction between not guilty and innocent is more
than a semantic parlor game. The principal function of the trier of
fact in a criminal case, to wit, to determine if the prosecution has
met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, cannot
be properly carried out without a grasp of the subtle but critical
distinction between the two terms.
This article presents an analysis of the background and pur-
pose of trial by jury, presumption of innocence, and burden of
proof as bases from which the substantive distinction between not
guilty and innocent emanates. With more particularity, the article
focuses upon the widespread misuse of the word innocence in lieu
of not guilty, and the by-product of this misuse-the erroneous
statement by courts, practicing attorneys and drafters of jury in-
structions that the function of the jury is to determine the "guilt
or innocence" of the accused. The article illustrates some of the
obvious as well as more circuitous means by which these errors
and their resulting confusion are transmitted to the jury, princi-
pally by way of jury instructions.
* Member of California Bar. B.B.A., University of Miami, 1956; L.L.B., U.C.L.A.,
1964. The author served as a Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney from 1964-
1972, and is the co-author of two non-fiction crime books, HELTER SKELTER and TILL
DEATH Us Do PART. Article reprinted, with permission, from 4 CRIM. J.J. 349 (1981).
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II. BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution guarantees the right to trial
by jury in a criminal prosecution in article III, section 2, clause
3,1 and the sixth amendment. 2
The concept of trial by jury came to America with the En-
glish colonists who insisted on the jury method of trial. The found-
ing fathers who wrote our Constitution had learned from history.
They strived for safeguards against the use of unfounded criminal
charges brought merely to eliminate the political enemies of those
in power. As one safeguard, the Framers of the Constitution at-
tempted to establish an independent judiciary. By guaranteeing
those accused of crime the right to be tried by a jury of their
peers, they added yet another layer of protection from arbitrary or
politically motivated prosecutions. In 1789, Thomas Jefferson
wrote to Thomas Paine, "I consider trial by jury as the only
anchor yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held
to the principles of its constitution."' The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of jury trial: "[W]e
believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice . . .-
Along with the right to a jury trial, the presumption of inno-
cence and the prosecution's burden of proving the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt have been conjunctive bedrocks of the
Anglo-American system of law. The United States Supreme
Court has stated that the right to a fair trial is a fundamental
right secured by the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.5 The presumption of innocence and burden of proof
are designed to help insure that those accused of crime are af-
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ch. 3. "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said
Crimes shall have been committed . Id.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence. Id.
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (1789). See also Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965). "The [jury trial] clause was clearly intended to protect the
accused from oppression by the government. ... Id.
4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
5. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
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forded this right.
In emphasizing the importance of the presumption of inno-
cence, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe
presumption, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a ba-
sic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal jus-
tice."' The presumption serves as an admonishment to the jury to
reach their verdict solely on the evidence adduced at trial, and not
on the basis of suspicions, appearances, and personal opinions that
may arise from the fact of the defendant's arrest, indictment, cus-
tody, or matters not introduced as proof at trial.'
The Supreme Court has also held that the concomitant com-
mandment prohibiting a criminal conviction of any person except
upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 8 Applicable to all the states, this bur-
den of proof has been enunciated by every state legislature in the
land. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case is premised on the seminal value determination of
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to
let a guilty man go free.9
The operative interrelationship between the presumption of
innocence and the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is simply this: the presumption of innocence permits the ac-
cused to remain inactive and secure, unless and until the prosecu-
tion overcomes the presumption by producing evidence which ef-
fectively meets their legal burden of proof." The presumption of
innocence attends the accused throughout the trial, and applies to
every fact that must be established in order to prove his guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt."
6. id.
7. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
8. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
9. Id. at 372.
10. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 n. 12 (1978).
11. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899). Though from a public policy
standpoint, the effect of the presumption of innocence is clearly a salutary one, it could be
argued that the same effect could be obtained without the presumption, and by only retain-
ing its corollaries, eliminate the legal infirmity and fiction surrounding the presumption of
innocence. Legal presumptions are based on the rationale of probability. Under certain
situations, experience has shown that when fact "A" is present, the presence of fact "B" is
so probable that fact "B" should be presumed to exist unless and until an adverse party
disproves it, e.g., a letter correctly addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been
received in the ordinary course of mail.
When, however, we apply this underlying basis for a legal presumption to the pre-
sumption of innocence, the presumption, it would seem, should fall. Statistics and convic-
1983]
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III. DEFINING TERMS
Whenever the terms guilty, not guilty, and innocent are used
in a criminal trial, it is essential that their specific meanings be
defined to, and understood by, the jury. It is also essential that the
usage of these terms. by the court and counsel during a trial be
consistent with the definitions stated. Any incorrect or contradic-
tory language may result in the jury being misled and confused as
to its role in the trial.
In common usage, the word guilty is a specific factual
description of a reality. It describes a person who committed the
act or crime. 2 Whether the prosecution can prove that he actually
did it is a separate question to be determined at trial. A second
meaning of the word guilty refers to the subjective conclusion of
the jury in the form of a verdict in a criminal trial.1" This conclu-
tion rates show it is ridiculous to presume that when the average defendant is arrested,
charged with a crime, and brought to trial, he is usually innocent. But obviously, the con-
verse presumption that a defendant is presumed to be guilty would be far worse and, in-
deed, intolerable. Our system, for readily apparent reasons, is infinitely superior to those in
nations, mostly totalitarian, which presume an arrested person is guilty and place the bur-
den on the accused to prove his innocence.
The solution would seem to be to simply eliminate the presumption of innocence in-
struction to the jury, keeping those two necessary corollaries of the presumption which do
have enormous merit: First, the fact that the defendant has been arrested for and charged
with a crime is no evidence of his guilt and should not be used against him; and secondly
and more importantly, under our system of justice the prosecution has the burden of prov-
ing guilt. The defendant has no burden to prove his innocence.
It is one thing to say that the defendant does not have to prove his innocence, and that
in the absence of affirmative proof of guilt he is entitled to a not guilty verdict. To go a step
further, however, and say that he is legally presumed to be innocent when he has just been
brought to court in handcuffs seems to be hollow rhetoric. One day a defendant is going to
stand up in court and tell the judge, "Your Honor, if I am legally presumed to be innocent,
why have I been arrested for this crime, why has a criminal complaint been filed against
me, and why am I now here in court being tried?"
As any seasoned criminal trial lawyer will attest, for the most part juries see through
the transparent fiction of the presumption of innocence. Whether they verbalize it or not,
as reasonable human beings they know that if the defendant seated at the counsel table in
front of them were truly, in the eyes of the law, legally presumed to be innocent, they
would not have been impaneled to hear and adjudicate the charges brought against him by
the law. It is entirely within the rubric of reason that the articulation of the presumption of
innocence by the judge to the jury may, on balance, rebound to the detriment of the ac-
cused. If the jury knows the presumption of innocence is a legal fiction, yet the judge
intones the dynamics of the presumption to them in a very sober manner, and with the
straightest of countenances, could it be that he thereby loses a speck of credibility in their
eyes? And when he subsequently instructs them on those matters which are legally sound
and designed by the law to be protective of and beneficial to the defendant (e.g., doctrine
of reasonable doubt), they may not take his words as seriously as they should?
12. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 585 (1980)
defines guilty as "[hiaving committed a crime .... "
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 637 (5th ed. 1979) defines a "guilty verdict" as
"[flormal pronouncement by jury that they adjudge the defendant guilty of the offense
charged."
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sion comes into existence only at the end of the trial, and only if
the prosecution has convinced the jury of the factual guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
In common usage, the word innocent, as with the word guilty,
is a specific factual description of a reality. It describes a person
who did not commit the act or crime. 14 A person who is innocent
is defined, in both common and legal usage, as one who is "free
from guilt. ' 15 Whether or not he is convicted or acquitted is a
separate question to be determined at trial. As in factual guilt,
factual innocence exists regardless of the subjective conclusion of
the jury. Unlike the word guilty, the word innocent has no court
verdict counterpart in American criminal law. "Innocent" is not
one of the possible verdicts that a jury may return. A defendant
who is not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is found to be
"Not Guilty."
In ordinary lay usage, the term not guilty is often considered
to be synonymous with innocent." In American criminal jurispru-
dence, however, they are not synonymous. "Not Guilty" is a legal
finding by the jury that the prosecution has not met its burden of
proof. A "Not Guilty" verdict can result from either of two states
of mind on the part of the jury: that they believe the defendant is
factually innocent and did not commit the crime; or, although
they do not necessarily believe he is innocent, and even "tend" to
believe he did commit the crime, the prosecution's case was not
sufficiently strong to convince them of his guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.
Within this second state of mind (reasonable doubt) resulting
in a "Not Guilty" verdict lies the distinction between the terms
not guilty and innocent. It is generally accepted that the doctrine
of reasonable doubt is, as Sir Winston Churchill once described
Soviet Russia, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
Legal scholars and authorities say it simply cannot be satisfacto-
rily defined and to attempt to do so only confuses further.'" How-
14. In Ebberts v. State Board of Control, 84 Cal. App. 3d 329, 335, 148 Cal. Rptr.
543, 546 (1978), the court stated "[w]e interpret the phrase 'not committed at all' in [CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ ] 4900 and 4903 to mean that the claimant can show the board that he
was 'innocent' in the sense that he did not do the acts which characterize the crime. This is
the only sensible meaning we believe we can give to the use of the term 'innocent'.
(emphasis added).
15. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 595 (7th ed. 1976), BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979), and BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (3rd ed. 1969)
define "innocent" as freedom from guilt.
16. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD THESAURuS 316 (1971).
17. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341, at 798-800 (2d ed. 1972);
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ever, there is one all-important principle that is implicit in the
term - namely, that a jury does not have to believe in a defen-
dant's innocence in order to return a verdict of not guilty. Even
their belief in his guilt, if only a moderately held one, should not
result in a guilty verdict. To convict, their belief in his guilt must
be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Why is such a notion implicit? Since no thorough examina-
tion by any student of the doctrine of reasonable doubt could con-
clude that a jury has to believe in a defendant's innocence as a
prerequisite to their returning a verdict of not guilty, it is perhaps
not imperative to attempt to articulate why such a conclusion is
implicit in the term. Nonetheless, and without having read or even
heard of any prior writing on the subject, I make this effort: if the
judge were to merely instruct the jury that to convict the defen-
dant they had to be "convinced of the defendant's guilt," the issue
for the jury to resolve would seem to be guilt as opposed to what?
The inference is innocence, i.e., the opposite side of guilt is inno-
cence. So the question would be that of guilt or innocence. But the
judge does not give this truncated instruction. To the words "con-
vinced of the defendant's guilt" he appends the words "beyond a
reasonable doubt." It would seem we have now jettisoned the pre-
viously inferential "innocence," at least to the extent that it no
longer is a sine qua non in the legal equation necessary for a ver-
dict of not guilty. Now the issue seems to be guilt as opposed to
what? Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The new comparison
seems to be between believing in guilt on one hand, and believing
in guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the other. In other words,
when the judge tells the jury that to convict, they have to be con-
vinced not only of guilt, but guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he
clearly is telling them that a mere belief in guilt is not enough to
convict. And if a mere belief in guilt is not enough to convict, and
has to result in a not guilty verdict, a fortiori, a belief in inno-
cence is not necessary in order to result in a not guilty verdict.' 8
ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS, ILLINOIS PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, § 2.05 (1968): "We have so frequently discussed
the futility of attempting to define reasonable doubt that we might expect the practice to
be discontinued."; J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2497, at 317 (3d ed. 1940):
"[t]his elusive and undefinable state of mind."; Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Pre-
sumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59, 63 (1933): "It is coming to be
recognized that all attempts to define reasonable doubt by paraphrase or circumlocution
tend to obfuscate rather than clarify the concept." Many courts, in abject surrender, e.g.,
the United States Seventh Circuit, do not even attempt to define reasonable doubt in any
way whatsoever to the jury.
18. As if the concept of reasonable doubt did not have enough indigenous semantic
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Since a "Not Guilty" verdict can be predicated on that "gray
zone" of uncertainty somewhere between a belief in innocence and
the required proof of guilt, it would be incorrect to state that a
conclusion of "Not Guilty" means that the jury believes the de-
fendant is innocent. Although a verdict of "Not Guilty" certainly
may be based upon a belief in the defendant's innocence, it just as
certainly may be based on a hesitation in belief of guilt which
amounts to a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury.
Inasmuch as the terms not guilty and innocent have for the
most part been used interchangeably throughout the years by lay
people as well as by the legal profession, 9 instead of the correct
term "Guilty or Not Guilty" being used exclusively, the far more
common, but incorrect term "Guilt or Innocence" has insidiously
crept into the American language and consciousness. Although
the precise date and locus of its misconceived birth are not known,
it has led a very robust life, shows no sign of aging and, as we
shall see, has been invested with the imprimatur of the highest
court in the land.
While a defendant's guilt or innocence obviously is the most
important moral issue at every criminal trial, and could not possi-
bly be more legally relevant (since if a jury believes a defendant is
innocent they must find him "Not Guilty"), the defendant's guilt
or innocence is not the issue for the jury to determine. It is
whether or not the prosecution has met its legal burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury answers in the nega-
tive, they must conclude that the defendant is "Not Guilty," even
in those situations where they tend to believe he did commit the
problems, I might add that the word "beyond" in the term "beyond a reasonable doubt" is
an unnecessary element of a concept already mired in metaphysical confusion. During my
years as a prosecutor, I noted how defense counsel, in discussing the term "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt," emphasized the word "beyond" as if the prosecution had to go beyond the
horizon and to the ends of the earth to prove guilt. Because of the confusing, misleading
context in which it was used, I developed a line of thought to explain to the jury the word
"beyond." I pointed out to the jury that in "beyond a reasonable doubt." "beyond" is a
needless appendage which is not even used in its principal sense of "further," i.e., "more
than." (If it were, the prosecution would have to prove there is more than a reasonable
doubt of a defendant's guilt, when obviously, they have to prove just the opposite-that
there is less than a reasonable doubt.) Instead, "beyond" is used in the sense of "to the
exclusion of," i.e., the prosecutor has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt to the
exclusion of all reasonable doubt. Excising the word "beyond" from the term "beyond a
reasonable doubt," I would proceed to tell the jury the much more simple: "If you do not
have a reasonable doubt of guilt, convict. If you do have a reasonable doubt, acquit." I
then went on to define reasonable doubt as a sound, sensible, logical doubt reasonably
based upon the evidence in the case.
19. See infra nn. 22-37 and accompanying text.
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crime.20 To summarize: if the issue for the jury to determine at a
criminal trial were the defendant's guilt or innocence, this would
mean that after an evaluation of the testimony and evidence, it
would have to decide whether or not the defendant committed the
crime, i.e., did he do it or did he not do it? But that is not its
function. Its duty is to determine whether or not the prosecution
has met its legal burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the jury does not understand this critical dis-
tinction, it cannot properly fulfill its function as the trier of fact.
Though the distinction between the terms not guilty and in-
nocent is a crucial one, and integral to a jury's ability to properly
perform its task, it is nothing short of incredible that with legal
treatises having been written on virtually every point of law
imaginable, apparently none has ever been written on the subject
in America. At least, this writer has never come across such an
article or treatise and none is listed in the Index to Legal Periodi-
cals, or the Criminal Justice Periodical Index.2"
The purpose of this article is not to pass judgment on what
the function of the trier of fact in a criminal case should be. It is
certain that arguments could be advanced for the proposition that
perhaps the determination of guilt or innocence should be the
function of the jury. The point is that under existing law it is not.
Yet, the number of times and the number of situations in which
this incorrect statement is communicated to the jury by judge and
counsel is astonishing and unsettling.
IV. CASE DISCUSSION
The misstatement that it is the role of the jury in a criminal
trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant has been
20. In Scottish criminal procedure, where conviction or acquittal is decided by the
majority vote of a jury of fifteen, the jury is not restricted to a verdict of "Guilty" or "Not
Guilty." There is a third possibility designed to cover the situation where there is a suspi-
cion of guilt but not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt. The third possible verdict is
"Not Proven." (Scottish wags refer to the verdict as one of "Not Guilty, but don't do it
again.") The principal criticism of the Scottish verdict system has been the lingering
stigma that attaches to one whose trial only culminated in a "Not Proven" verdict. A.
GIBB, N. WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 683 (5th ed. 1952); T.
SMITH, BRITISH JUSTICE: THE SCOTTISH CONTRIBUTION 125, 126 (1961).
21. At the risk of sounding presumptuous, the first specific writing on the subject
that this writer is aware of is in this writer's own book, HELTER SKELTER (Norton ed. at
383, 1974; Bantam ed. at 520, 1975). A more expanded discussion appears in my second
book, TILL DEATH Us Do PART (Norton ed. at 363-65, 1978; Bantam ed. at 378-81, 1979)
and in my Tactics and Techniques in Handling Each Phase of a Criminal Trial, 2 TRIAL
DIPLOMACY JOURNAL at 34-35 (1979).
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given currency even in the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
In the 1964 case of Jackson v. Denno,22 the United States
Supreme Court stated the task of the jury as one of "adjudicating
guilt or innocence. "23 It was not merely an isolated misstatement
by the Court. The Court incorrectly referred to the determination
of "guilt or innocence" as being the jury's function no less than
seven times in the Jackson opinion. 4
The Supreme Court again specifically dealt with juries in the
1970 case of Williams v. Florida.2" The Court was tracing the
development of jury trials when it emphasized the importance of
"the concept of relying on a body of one's peers to determine guilt
or innocence as a safeguard against arbitrary law enforcement. '26
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided Apodaca
v. Oregon,27 dealing with the community makeup of jury panels.
The Court stated that various segments of a community have "the
right to participate in the overall legal processes by which crimi-
nal guilt or innocence are determined.' 28
The Court was ironically concerned with the implications
that words may carry, and the detrimental effect that misstate-
ments may have on the jury, in the 1978 case of Taylor v. Ken-
tucky.29 In the very sentence wherein the Court expressed concern
over the danger that one of the statements made at trial by the
prosecution was misconstrued by the jury, the Court misstated the
task of the jury to be one of "determining petitioner's guilt or
innocence."30
The cases referred to above are but a few examples of the
United States Supreme Court, in case after case, continuing to
loosely and erroneously define the principal function of the jury in
a criminal trial. Needless to say, far less insightful state, county,
and municipal courts throughout the land make this same
mistake.
There are hundreds of state appellate court cases that abound
22. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
23. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 374, 379, 387, 394 (three times), 395.
25. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
26. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
27. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
28. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
29. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
30. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
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with the misstatement. In People v. Collins,3 the California Su-
preme Court, one of the nation's premier courts, said that "the
testimony as to mathematical probability infected the case with
fatal error and distorted the jury's traditional role of determining
guilt or innocence .... "32 In the New York case of People v.
Jenkins,33 the court stated:
In the trial minutes it appears that the court was asked ... to
charge 'that the jury could find either defendant Minor or defendant
Jenkins guilty or innocent of each count, and that they need not find
both either guilty or innocent.' On both occasions, the court refused
to charge as requested. This was error, for the jury did have the
right to treat each defendant separately and to weigh the evidence
concerning each defendant in order to determine the guilt or inno-
cence of each." '
Can it be that notwithstanding the fact that courts, legal ex-
perts and lawyers35 insist on erroneously articulating the function
of a jury as being the determination of guilt or innocence, they
nonetheless clearly realize the jury's sole function is to determine
whether or not the prosecution has proven guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt and that this is not synonymous with "determining
guilt or innocence"? This seems highly unlikely. Were they to
truly know the critical distinction between the two terms, they
would necessarily be aware that they are perpetuating the confu-
sion by verbalizing, in their legal opinions and writings, the notion
that it is the jury's function to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. This is obviously not to suggest that a grasp of the
distinction is beyond the cerebral profundity of the violators.
What is suggested by this erroneous use of the term "guilt or in-
nocence" is the fact that they may never have addressed their
minds to the subject. The apparent total absence of any legal writ-
ings on the subject is one reason, undoubtedly, for this inattention
to the matter. Despite this inattention, I maintain that most ju-
rists and legal authorities do have a fuzzy, unarticulated, visceral
31. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
32. Id. at 320, 438 P.2d at 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 497 (emphasis added).
33. 47 A.D.2d 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
34. Id. at 736 (emphasis added). Not only the courts, but legal experts as well,
misapprehend or misstate the function of the trier of fact in a criminal trial. For example,
see R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1969): "Criminal Procedure is the
formal machinery which has been established to enforce the substantive criminal law. Its
broad outlines include (1) accusation of crime, (2) determination of guilt or innocence and
(3) disposition of those convicted." Id. at I (emphasis added).
35. See infra sections VI and VII.
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grasp of the distinction. The grasp is just not sufficiently pinioned
and conceptualized in their minds to cause them to speak or write
correctly on the subject. In other words, they "know" the distinc-
tion, but they "really don't know."
On the other hand, I believe that with a goodly number of
our legal brethren, the depth of their intellectual detachment from
the subject is such that when they proclaim it is the role of the
jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, they may
mean precisely what they are saying, i.e., they may truly believe
the jury's ultimate legal function is to determine whether or not
the defendant committed the crime for which he is on trial. For
instance, in the 1981 case of Bullington v. Missouri," no less a
legal scholar than United States Supreme Court Justice Powell
declared:
Underlying the question of guilt or innocence is an objective truth:
the defendant, in fact, did or did not commit the acts constituting
the crime charged. From the time an accused is first suspected to
the time the decision on guilt or innocence is made, our criminal
justice system is designed to enable the trier of fact to discover that
truth according to law.3
7
V. JURIES
When juries are initially exposed to the criminal justice sys-
tem, they are immediately overwhelmed by the nomenclature. The
attorneys and court communicate in a language that is a mixture
of English and Latin, oftentimes with strained interpretations
thereof. They speak in technical terms of law, and debate ad
nauseam over the meanings of a single word, each advocating a
different reading. The sum total of a juror's exposure to criminal
courtroom terminology and procedure may consist of what has
been gleaned from newspapers, magazines and television. Any im-
36. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
37. Id. at 450 (emphasis added). In F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND
VANZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1927), the author writes:
At the trial, the killing of Parmenter and Berardelli was undisputed. The
only issue was the identity of the murderers. Were Sacco and Vanzetti two
of the assailants of Parmenter and Berardelli, or were they not? This was
the beginning and the end of the inquiry at the trial; this is the beginning
and the end of any judgment now on the guilt or innocence of these men.
Every other issue, no matter how worded, is relevant only as it helps to an-
swer that central question,
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pressions they possess when they first venture into the courtroom
may likely be based upon misinformation. The most salient exam-
ples of such misinformation are the use of the word innocent as
being synonymous with not guilty, and the belief that they are to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
These misconceptions are reinforced wherever they turn. It is
common practice for the media to report a defendant's plea of
"Not Guilty" as a plea of "Innocence." Likewise, as referred to
earlier, the press rather consistently reports that a defendant has
been found "Innocent" when a jury returns a verdict of "Not
Guilty." The term "guilt or innocence" is used in books and plays.
Television shows and movies talk about "guilt or innocence."
When a jury is deliberating, the press reports that they are delib-
erating the "guilt or innocence" of the accused.38 With this con-
stant inundation, lay people naturally believe that the whole pur-
pose of a criminal trial is to ascertain whether or not the
defendant committed the crime. Even in the absence of such a
deluge, those unlettered in the law would almost automatically
make this assumption. After all, though the prosecutor and de-
fense attorney get caught up in the adversary proceeding-with its
attendant, unblushing effort to maximize advantages, minimize
disadvantages, and propound or circumvent those technical rules
of law and procedure which they perceive to be favorable or unfa-
vorable to their cause-jurors have a much more pristine view of
justice. To them, justice is finding out the truth and then giving a
person his due. And the question-"did the defendant commit the
crime or not"-is much more compatible with their concept of
justice than what they view as the game-like-"did the prosecu-
tion prove it beyond a reasonable doubt or not."
Whatever the reason or genesis for the belief, by and large
the notion that a jury determines the guilt or innocence of a de-
fendant accompanies the new juror into the courtroom. Not only
is the juror rarely, if ever, disabused of this misconception by the
court, but as we shall soon see, the notion is usually fortified and
repeated by the very court whose duty it is to rectify the
misconception.
The court, and attorneys practicing before it, take the time to
correctly define and explain technical terms, phrases and issues
38. For example, see NEWSWEEK, March 2, 1981 at 38: "For twelve weeks Jean
Harris has stood trial for the murder of Dr. Herman Tarnower, and at the weekend the
jury was still deliberating her guilt or innocence." (emphasis added).
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for the benefit of the jury so that they will be able to properly
evaluate the evidence and make an informed and intelligent deci-
sion with respect thereto. It is ironic that the ultimate issue for the
jury to decide is almost invariably left unclarified at best, and at
worst, the misconception the jurors have of their role is further
underlined in their minds.
VI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Incorrect and confusing jury instructions on the principal
function of the jury run throughout the criminal courts of the na-
tion. In fact, one could not be accused of engaging in hyperbole to
assert that literally hundreds of thousands of defendants through-
out the years have been tried, and are continuing to be tried, by
juries who have been misinstructed on the most fundamental issue
at a criminal trial-the burden of proof in a criminal trial.
This article's examination of inaccurate and confusing jury
instructions will focus primarily on pattern jury instructions for
several basic reasons. First, pattern instructions are written and
compiled by experienced legal authorities, generally current or
past judges. As members of the bench, they are held to possess the
erudition and skill to state and interpret the law correctly. Second,
pattern jury instructions are in widespread use by courts and at-
torneys in virtually every jurisdiction. They are continually held to
be representative, if not definitive, of the instructions to be given.
Third, pattern instructions are normally not challenged as to con-
tent on appeal. More often than not, challenges revolving around a
pattern instruction are on the basis of the instruction having been
given or not given, without debate over whether it was correctly
written in the first place.
The very fact that pattern jury instructions are used so exten-
sively throughout the land makes the errors and confusions ex-
posed by this article's analysis all the more egregious.
A. Federal Courts
One of the most widely used sources of pattern jury instruc-
tions for federal criminal trials is Federal Jury Practice and In-
structions.39 Compiled by Judge Edward J. Devitt 40 and Professor
39. 1 E. DEVITT, C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (3d
ed. 1977) (hereinafter cited in text as Devitt and Blackmar).
40. Honorable Edward J. Devitt, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota.
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Charles B. Blackmar,"4 the pattern instructions are premised on
those which have met with appellate approval in actual cases, and
from suggested instructions furnished by over forty federal
judges."2
Devitt and Blackmar have devoted an entire chapter to the
purpose and practical "Do's and Dont's" of jury instructions. In
emphasizing the qualities of a proper instruction, Devitt and
Blackmar assert that an instruction should be clear, concise and
accurate. 43 A good instruction, they note, is not vague, contradic-
tory, nor unclear."
Yet even with the impeccable credentials of Devitt and
Blackmar, the respected nature of their sources, and their specific
concern for the importance of consistent, accurate and clear in-
structions, their instructions on the role of a jury in a criminal
trial are hopelessly contradictory, inaccurate and hence, unclear.
Examples of flat-out incorrect and in some cases inconsistent in-
structions in Devitt and Blackmar follow.
In § 11.06 of Devitt and Blackmar, an instruction given by
courts throughout the land, the judge properly instructs the jury
that to convict the defendant, they must conclude that his guilt
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" But unbelievably, in
the very same instruction, and as if he were merely stating the
same thing in a different way, he tells the jurors: "You are here to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused . . ... 4 To
twelve people chosen from the community and unschooled in the
law, inasmuch as the word innocent, in common usage, means to-
tally free of culpability (i.e., an innocent party is one who did not
commit the crime), the subject instruction can only be translated
by the jury to mean: "You are here to determine whether or not
the defendant committed the crime."
The offending instruction, § 11.06, is compounded by other
instructions liberally sprinkled throughout Devitt and Blackmar
which seem to affirm to the jury what they have always be-
lieved-that the purpose of the trial is to determine whether or
41. Charles B. Blackmar, Professor of Law, St. Louis University, St. Louis,
Missouri.
42. 1 DEVITT AND BLACKMAR, supra note 39, at I1, Ill.
43. Id. § 8.01 at 241.
44. Id. § 8.01, at 245 (citing Thomas, Improvement in Charges to Juries, I F.R.D.
141 (1940)).
45. Id. § 11.06.
46. Id. (emphasis added). This added instruction is not only inconsistent with the
previous instruction, but, as we have seen, has no place under existing law.
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not the defendant committed the crime. "Determining Guilt or In-
nocence" is used in the instructions on flight and concealment,47
suppression or fabrication of evidence,48 false statements,49 and in
seven other instructions.5" In instruction § 18.02, the jury is told
that "[t]he punishment provided by law for the offense charged in
the indictment is a matter exclusively within the province of the
Court, and should never be considered by the jury in any way, in
arriving at an impartial verdict as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused."5
There is another type of instruction in Devitt and Blackmar
which, although technically correct, is fraught with potential con-
fusion for the jury and, if not preceded by an instruction defining
the distinction between innocent and not guilty, may end up mis-
leading them on their role just as much as the aforementioned
incorrect instructions. Instruction § 11.14 of Devitt and Blackmar,
the general instruction on burden of proof and reasonable doubt,
provides, inter alia, "So if the jury, after careful and impartial
consideration of all of the evidence in the case, has a reasonable
doubt that a defendant is guilty of the charge, it must acquit."5
Instruction § 11.14 then concludes that "[i]f the jury views the
evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of two conclu-
sions-one of innocence, the other of guilt-the jury should of
course adopt the conclusion of innocence."53 This instruction is
technically correct because as opposed to incorrect instructions
such as § 11.06, discussed earlier, which tell the jury that it is its
function to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, in-
struction § 11.14 only points out to the jury that it may be con-
fronted with a situation where the evidence in the case reasonably
permits a conclusion that the defendant did not commit the crime
(innocence) just as much as it permits the conclusion that he did
(guilt), and if that occurs, they are to adopt the conclusion of in-
nocence. Very obviously, the jury invariably wants to know
whether or not the defendant is innocent. And as stated earlier, if
they form the belief he is innocent, they have no choice but to
return a verdict of "Not Guilty." However, to avoid confusing and
47. Id. § 15.08.
48. Id. § 15.09.
49. Id. 8 15.12.
50. Id. 88 18.06, 18.12, 27.02, 35.22, 41.12, 44.10, 58.15.
51. Id. § 18.02 (emphasis added).
52. Id. § 11.14.
53. Id. In most states, identical or similar language is customarily contained within
the instructions on circumstantial evidence, not reasonable doubt.
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misleading the jury, § 11.14 should only be given after the jury
has already been instructed on the distinction between not guilty
and innocent.54 Without this previous elucidation, the jury is very
apt to construe § 11.14 not just to mean that where the evidence
indicating the defendant did not commit the crime (innocence) is
just as strong as the evidence indicating that he did (guilt), they
are to conclude that he is innocent, but that whether or not he
committed the crime is the ultimate issue for them to decide,
which it is not. In other words, as instructions like § 11.14 pro-
vide, the quest by the jury to ascertain whether or not the accused
is innocent is clearly a proper and inevitable one, but it should
never be made in the context of "guilt or innocence" being the
issue for them to resolve.
The infirmity inherent in Devitt and Blackmar instruction §
11.14 can be stated in another way. The last sentence of § 11.14
specifies two conclusions: one of innocence and one of guilt. 5" But
as we have seen, there is another conclusion that a jury may
reach. This third conclusion is that "gray zone" where the jury
does not necessarily believe that the defendant is innocent, yet are
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Where the
jury comes into court believing that its function is to determine
the "guilt or innocence" of the accused, and the court reinforces
this incorrect notion through other jury instructions (e.g., §
11.06), the flames of confusion are only fanned further by instruc-
tions such as § 11.14. If the jury is not specifically told that rea-
sonable doubt encompasses the subject "gray zone," the possibility
is increased that they will return a verdict of guilty in situations
where they only "tend" to believe the defendant committed the
crime. Since § 11.14 does not speak to the gray zone at all, the
jury is left on its own to discern its existence and then to interpret
its effect.
54. Id. In the DEVITT AND BLACKMAR pattern jury instructions, there exists no in-
struction which defines the difference between the terms not guilty and innocent. In fact,
the DEVIT AND BLACKMAR criminal jury instructions seem to take pains to tell the jury
that their lay belief that the terms not guilty and innocent are synonymous is correct. How
else could a juror reasonably construe the judge's words in § 18.06, the instruction on lesser
included offenses, when he instructs the jury:
[I]f your unanimous verdict is that the accused is 'Not Guilty' of the crime
charged in the indictment, you will have your foreperson fill in, date and sign
that verdict; and then proceed to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused with respect to the lesser offense of which is nec-
essarily included in the crime of charged in the indictment.
(emphasis added).
55. 1 DEVITT AND BLACKMAR, supra note 39, at § 11.14.
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The above examples represent instances where Devitt and
Blackmar have ignored their own prescriptions for proper jury in-
structions. By misstating the role of the jury as that of determin-
ing guilt or innocence, they have created inaccurate and inconsis-
tent instructions. With the failure to define and differentiate
between innocent and not guilty, they have drafted confusing in-
structions which require mastery of abstract concepts for which
they provide no guidelines. Devitt and Blackmar have forgotten
their own words which they urged attorneys and judges to remem-
ber when formulating instructions: "[T]he task is to shed light
and not add to the darkness.""6 Judge Devitt and Professor Black-
mar have almost assuredly turned the lights out for many jurors
with the confusing and incorrect instructions referred to
hereinbefore.
B. State Courts
This article's discussion of incorrect and confusing jury in-
structions commenced with a discussion of Devitt and Blackmar
simply because of the uniform reliance upon it by so many federal
courts throughout the nation. An examination of pattern jury in-
structions in the individual state courts in the land, however,
though not uniform, reveals the same generic type of incorrect
and/or confusing instructions in the overwhelming majority of the
states. Some states have both types of instructions; others just one
or the other. Very few are "innocent" as to both instructions.
What follows is a representative sampling of the two types of mis-
leading instructions in the various states. 7
Florida, instruction § 2.14 (incorrect):
Just as the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused
rests solely and absolutely with you, so also does the determination
of the extent of punishment ...rest solely with the Court. When
you have determined the guilt or innocence of the accused, you have
completely fulfilled your solemn obligation under your oaths. 8
Illinois, instruction § 3.02 (confusing):
56. Id. § 8.02, at 243.
57. Those instructions which tell the jury that their role is to determine or decide the
guilt or innocence of the accused are categorized as "incorrect." Those that simply point
out to the jury that some types of evidence indicate or bear upon the defendant's guilt,
some upon his innocence, are denominated "confusing."
58. THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES (1970).
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Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which
give rise to a reasonable inference of other facts which tend to show
the guilt or innocence of the defendant . . .
Kansas, instruction § 51.10 (incorrect):
Your only concern in this case is determining the guilt or innocence
of the defendant . . .60
Oregon, instruction § 203.01 (confusing):
If you find that the defendant has previously been convicted of a
crime, you may consider this for its bearing on the believability of
his testimony; and it must not be considered by you as any evidence
bearing upon his guilt or innocence of the crime charged here.6"
California, instruction § 2.52 (incorrect):
The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime
. . . is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact
which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other
proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence
62
Texas, instruction § 0.05 (incorrect):
The defendant is presumed to be innocent until [his] guilt is estab-
lished by legal evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and, in case you
have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, you will acquit the
defendant and say by your verdict 'not guilty.' Your verdict must be
in writing and signed by your foreman. Your sole duty at this time is
to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant under the in-
dictment in this cause . . ..
Mississippi, instruction § 166 (incorrect):
[Ilt is the sworn duty of each and every juror . . . to vote . . . for
59. THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL (1968).
60. THE COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, KANSAS DISTRICT JUDGES
ASSOCIATION, PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS (1971).
61. THE OREGON STATE BAR COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ORE-
GON JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES (1979).
62. THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPE-
RIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL (4th
ed. 1979).
63. THE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY CHARGES OF THE STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, TEXAS CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY CHARGES (1975).
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an acquittal of the defendant, until and unless the mind of such ju-
ror is convinced beyond all reasonable doubt . . . from the evidence
or want of evidence . . . of the guilt of the defendant, . . . a juror
cannot under his oath as a juror compromise his honest conviction
from the evidence or from the want of evidence, as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant . . ..
Ohio, instruction § 405.01 (confusing):
If the circumstances create inferences that are equally consistent
with either innocence or guilt, such inferences must be resolved in
favor of the defendant's innocence.6 5
Tennessee, instruction § 37.07 (incorrect):
Evidence of an admission has been introduced in this case . . . . If
you find that the statement is true, you are the sole judge of the
weight that should be given it. You should consider it along with all
other evidence in the case in determining the defendant's guilt or
innocence.66
District of Columbia, instruction § 32 (incorrect):
Each defendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence as to each
of the crimes charged determined from his own conduct . . . as if he
were being tried alone. The guilt or innocence of any one defendant
• . . should not control or influence your verdicts respecting the
other defendants. You may find any one or more of the defendants
guilty or not guilty .... 67
As in the case of Devitt and Blackmar instruction § 11.06
discussed earlier," several states, in the very same instruction, tell
the jury that they have to determine whether the accused's guilt
has been established beyond a reasonable doubt as well as deter-
mine his guilt or innocence."9 A great many more states tell the
jury the same thing, but are considerate enough to confuse the
jury by giving the guilt or innocence instruction separate from the
reasonable doubt instruction. Irrespective of the way in which the
64. J. ALEXANDER, MISSISSIPPI JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 166 (1953).
65. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE OF THE OHIO JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL (1981).
66. THE COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) OF THE TENNES-
SEE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, TENNESSEE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL (1978).
67. THE JUNIOR BAR SECTION, THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1966).
68. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
69. See. e.g., Texas Instruction 0.05, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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misinformation is imparted to the jury, however, the helpless ju-
rors can only come to one of two conclusions, both of which are
incorrect. They can either conclude that determining guilt or inno-
cence is synonymous with determining whether guilt has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or they can infer that the two
issues are separate, and it is incumbent upon them to make both
determinations.
70
Even when trial judges depart from the pattern instructions
and frame their own charge to the jury, the non-legal concept of
guilt or innocence has so impregnated our conventional notion of
criminal justice that it nonetheless almost invariably surfaces. A
typical non-pattern charge to the jury was made by Bronx County
New York Judge Ivan Warner in the case of People of the State
of New York v. James Richardson:
7 1
If you are satisfied to a moral certainty that this defendant . . . is
guilty of any one of the crimes charged here, you may safely say
that you have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. If your
mind is wavering, or if you are uncertain . . . you have not been
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt ....
You have no right to . . . discuss . . . or speculate about pun-
ishment in any way . . . . Your working function is to determine
. . . the guilt or innocence of the defendant."'
As can be seen, the state pattern jury instructions dutifully
join the ranks of their federal counterparts in charging the jury in
a criminal trial with incorrect and confusing instructions on this
most fundamental of issues-the burden of proof in a criminal
trial.
Are the drafters of these pattern jury instructions, when they
inform juries that the issue for them to decide is the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, merely sloppy or do they actually believe
that the defendant's guilt or innocence is the issue to be resolved
by the jury? Of course, whether their use of words is ascribable to
70. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.10 (2) (McKinney 1982) seems to strongly sug-
gest this type of legal schizophrenia when it provides:
In its charge, the court must state the fundamental legal principles applica-
ble to criminal cases in general. Such principles include, but are not limited
to, the presumption of the defendant's innocence, the requirement that guilt
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury may not, in deter-
mining the issue of guilt or innocence, consider or speculate concerning mat-
ters relating to sentence or punishment.
71. People of the State of New York v. James Richardson, from S. PHILLIPs, No
HEROES, No VILLAINs 214 (Random House, 1977).
72. Id.
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sloppiness or to ignorance of this area of the law is immaterial,
since either way the jury is misinstructed. It is this writer's view
that, as stated earlier, no one who truly understands the legal con-
cepts involved would ever use the term "determining guilt or inno-
cence" to describe the issue for the jury to resolve. Moreover,
there is somewhat more concrete evidence that the source of the
problem, at least in some instances, is not mere sloppiness. A case
in point indicating that the drafters may believe the defendant's
guilt or innocence is "at issue" in a criminal trial is California
Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) § 2.25,'3 which provides:
When a witness refuses to testify as to any matter, basing his refusal
on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, you are not
to draw from that fact any inference as to the credibility of the wit-
ness or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 4
In the "Comment" following CALJIC § 2.25, the Committee
on Standard Jury Instructions (the drafters of CALJIC) state:
[California] Evidence Code § 913 provides that if a privilege is exer-
cised not to testify, no presumption shall arise because of such exer-
cise, and no inference may be drawn therefrom as to the credibility
of the witness 'or as to any matter at issue,' which would include
defendant's guilt or innocence . . .
VII. THE TRIAL PRACTITIONER
As with the courts, it is this writer's experience that the great
bulk of prosecutors and defense attorneys essentially use the two
terms "determining guilt or innocence" and "proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt" interchangeably. For instance, courtrooms
echo with the sound of defense lawyers arguing to juries in their
summations that the prosecution has not met its legal burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and in the next breath
telling the jury, "Now, in determining the guilt or innocence of
my client, take into consideration ....*" In fact, the textbook
73. THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, supra note 62, at § 2.25.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Two typical examples of this are found in J. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENT, THE
ART AND THE LAW (1969). While giving examples of good closing arguments, Stein ex-
cerpts the following from one of his summations: "You are the ones who take an oath to
determine guilt or innocence." Id. § 452 at 169 (emphasis added). Stein also excerpts the
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put out by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, National
College of Advocacy, states that "[t]he determination of guilt or
innocence is the sole province of the jury, and if none, the judge.
Prosecutor against defense counsel, plaintiff versus defen-
dant-with the determination of guilt or innocence left to an inde-
pendent arbiter-is the essence of our system."77
It should be noted that if the jury misconceives its role, this
inures to the benefit of the prosecution, since it is much easier for
the prosecutor to prove guilt (when the alternative for the jury is
innocence), than it is for him to have to prove not just guilt, but
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the defense that suffers from
the jury's misconception of its role.
If the thought which is uppermost in the jury's mind when
they retire to deliberate is "did he do it or did he not do it," as
opposed to "did the prosecution meet its burden of proof or did it
not meet its burden of proof," even if the evidence against the
defendant is only moderately strong (as opposed to the requisite
very strong) the jury will probably be psychologically attuned to a
conviction. But a defense attorney has a serious dilemma when he
argues to the jury that the prosecution has not met its legal bur-
den of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The baggage of
such an argument can be the implication that he has conceded his
client is not innocent. In other words, if his client had absolutely
nothing to do with the crime, and is completely innocent, how is it
appropriate to argue that his guilt has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt? Though there is no legal implication of guilt in
a reasonable doubt argument, as a practical matter it tends to go
in that direction, though by analogy, not as conspicously as a plea
of "Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity." While there is likewise no
legal concession of guilt in the insanity plea, that is the precise
effect of such a plea. Again, if a defendant had absolutely nothing
to do with the commission of the crime, a plea of "Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity" is completely inappropriate. The plea in effect
tells the jury, "I'm guilty, but give me a break because I'm
crazy."
The way in which a defense counsel should argue the crucial
following from the closing argument of Attorney V. J. McAlpin: "The prosecution has
failed to prove that Barbara Jean Templeton is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
judge will instruct you that you can find either or both of the defendants guilty or inno-
cent." Id. § 453 at 176 (emphasis added).
77. ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, PSYCHOLOGY AND PERSUASION
IN ADVOCACY 310 (2d ed. 1978).
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distinction between not guilty and innocent to a jury without
thereby implying to the jury that he has conceded his client is not
innocent is, in this writer's opinion, very often the single most im-
portant issue for counsel to deal with in his summation, but inas-
much as this issue concerns trial tactics and techniques it is
outside the margins of this article.
Suffice it to say, however, that it is obviously advisable, and
in fact nearly always essential, for defense counsel to argue his
client's innocence, but never in the context of guilt or innocence
being the issue for the jury to decide. The approach almost neces-
sarily has to be broken down into two levels. At the first level,
counsel can argue that the evidence proves, or at least points to,
his client's innocence, i.e., he did not commit the crime. Defense
counsel can then go on to the second level and argue that the pros-
ecution's case against his client was so weak that even if one or
more of the jurors nonetheless believes that he did commit the
crime, they certainly should not believe in his guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. And therefore, under the law, they still are duty-
bound to return a verdict of not guilty.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The hallowed injunction that no defendant in a criminal trial
may be convicted unless his guilt has been proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt has been organic to the American system of justice
since its inception. Our courts, legislatures, and constitutions have
made this clear. Inasmuch as the jury's ability to determine
whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof necessarily is
dependent upon its having a working knowledge of the legal con-
cepts involved in such a determination, the accuracy of the judge's
instructions to the jury is paramount.
This article has explored the two types of instructions which
can mislead the jury: the incorrect ones ("guilt or innocence"),
and the technically correct type which are villainous only if they
are not preceded by an instruction explaining the distinction be-
tween not guilty and innocent. Since there appears to be no juris-
diction which gives this explanatory instruction, the second type of
instruction can end up misleading the jury as much as the incor-
rect ones. But even in those few states whose pattern jury instruc-
tions do not contain either of these two types of instructions,7" and
78. See e.g., THE MINNESOTA DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON CRIMI-
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only give the correct instruction that to convict, guilt must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury is still most likely mis-
led as to its proper role. This is so because telling the jury that the
ultimate issue for them to determine is whether or not the prose-
cution has met its legal burden of proving guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt is not telling them that the ultimate issue is not the
defendant's guilt or innocence.7 9 A rough parallel is the complaint
frequently lodged against those doctors who tell their patients
what to do, but neglect to tell them what not to do.
Although, as we have seen, it is implicit in the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt instruction that the issue in a criminal trial is not
the defendant's guilt or innocence, it is pure folly to expect the
jury, on its own, to pick up that subtlety and make the translation
mentally. This is particularly true when as lay people, the jurors
have always naturally believed that the issue in a criminal trial is,
referring to the defendant, "did he do it, or did he not do it?"
Justice Learned Hand spoke of mental gymnastics beyond the
ability of jurors.80 Surely, if the United States Supreme Court and
courts throughout the land are confused in this area of the crimi-
nal law, or simply careless in their application of the relevant con-
cepts, how can we expect lay persons to comprehend the precious
distinctions inherent in terms such as reasonable doubt, not
guilty, and innocent? If we, the members of the legal profession,
do not educate them, and with all the simplicity and clarity of
expression we can muster, who will?
In light of the previous discussion in this article, it is recom-
mended that variations of the following instruction be incorpo-
rated into the pattern jury instructions at the state and federal
level:
Though you are naturally and properly concerned with the
question of whether the defendant in this case is guilty or innocent
of the crime for which he is presently standing trial, the issue for
NAL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES-CRIMINAL
(1977).
79. Interesting reading on the subject of confused jurors, even after jury instructions,
may be found in Strawn and Buchana, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICA-
TURE 478, 481 (1976), in which a Florida study concluded that an even 50% of the 116
Florida jurors involved in the study thought it was up to the defendant to prove his inno-
cence, after receiving the required Florida pattern jury instructions on presumption of inno-
cence and burden of proof. See also O'Mara and Eckartsberg, Proposed Standard Jury
Instructions-Evaluation of Usage and Understanding, PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION
QUARTERLY 542 (October, 1977).
80. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (3d Cir. 1932).
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you, the jury, to determine is not the defendant's guilt or innocence.
In other words, it is not to determine whether or not he committed
the crime charged in the [complaint, indictment, information, etc.].
The issue for you to determine is whether or not the prosecution has
met its legal burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ('to
the exclusion of all reasonable doubt' would be a preferable articula-
tion). These two issues are not the same.
Stated another way: to say one is guilty is to say he committed
the crime; to say one is innocent is to say he did not commit the
crime. In American criminal jurisprudence, however, the legal term
'Not Guilty' is not totally synonymous with innocence. 'Not Guilty'
is a legal finding by the jury that the prosecution has not met its
burden of proof. A 'Not Guilty' verdict based on the insufficiency of
the evidence can result from one of two states of mind on your part:
first, that you believe the defendant is innocent and did not commit
the crime; or, although you do not necessarily believe he is innocent,
and may even tend to believe he did commit the crime, the prosecu-
tion's case was not sufficiently strong to convince you of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. What flows from what I have just said is
that you do not have to believe the defendant is innocent in order to
return a verdict of 'Not Guilty.'
For those who would be horrified by such an instruction be-
cause of its admittedly pro-defense implications, I would make
these observations. The recommended instruction would obviously
not be the sole charge to the jury on the issue of reasonable doubt.
Standard instructions which point out that the prosecution does
not have the burden of proving guilt beyond all doubt, only a rea-
sonable doubt, and a reasonable doubt is not a mere possible
doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depend-
ing upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt, would have a counterpoising influence upon the jury. 1 But
most importantly, the recommended instruction is a clear and ac-
curate statement of the law as it presently exists. This article
takes no stance on whether the existing state of the law is a desir-
able one. It is written from the puristic standpoint and perspective
of the ivory tower. Perhaps the issue for the jury to determine
81. Many will fear that these latter instructions will not be sufficient to offset the
recommended pro-defense instruction, with the deleterious result being that more "factu-
ally guilty" defendants than ever before will walk out the courtroom door. If, for this rea-
son, the aforementioned proposed instruction is not given, at an absolute minimum the jury
should only receive the reasonable doubt instructions, and all references to "guilt or inno-
cence" as being the issue for the jury to decide should be deleted. Though there remains a
problem with this solution (see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text), at least the jury
will only be receiving legally correct instructions. As previously stated, a few states are
presently doing this. NEw YORK STATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-NEW YORK seems to be going in this direction also.
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should be the defendant's guilt or innocence.82 Or perhaps we
should supplant our present two verdict (Guilty or Not-Guilty)
system with the three verdict (Guilty, Not-Guilty, and Not-
Proven) system of Scotland. But two things are incontestable. As
members of the legal profession, we cannot engage in the breezy
practice of distorting what the law is simply because we do not
like or understand it. And if we do not correct the misconceptions
and errors which have been the subject of this article, we are just
as responsible as we would be if we had begotten them. We are, I
am told, the caretakers and the masters of the law. There is no
one else.8"
82. Almost by definition, however, this would necessitate lowering the burden of
proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to something lesser, such as the preponderance of
the evidence used in civil cases. This is so because, as stated earlier, it is implicit in the
very language of the doctrine of reasonable doubt that a jury does not have to believe in a
defendant's innocence as a condition precedent to their returning a verdict of not guilty.
83. An old Turkish proverb says that whoever tells the truth is chased out of nine
villages. If this article attracts all the attention of a new fly in the forest, so be it. But if it
does not, and the formidable status quo reflexively responds in a disquieting way to the
article's ramifications, it will be interesting to see where the lines of battle will be drawn,
what sides the various elements and forces in our legal community will take in the fray,
and the nobility and highness of purpose with which the confrontation will be waged.
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